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Contests are a common method to describe the distribution of many di⁄erent
types of rents. Yet in many of these situations the utilisation of the prize plays
an important role in determining agents￿payo⁄s and incentives. In this paper, we
investigate the incentives to expend e⁄ort for a prize that produces consumption
externalities and consider alternative regulatory policies. We ￿nd relatively more
global consumption externalities will increase (decrease) rent seeking when con-
sumption externalities are negative (positive). We show how introducing Pigouvian
taxation (possibly with revenue transfer) and Coasean bargaining alters equilib-
rium e⁄ort and payo⁄s. Pigouvian taxation tends to reduce both e⁄ort and payo⁄s
whereas this is not always the case for Coasean bargaining. In the presence of suf-
￿ciently large consumption externalities, establishing Pigouvian taxation coupled
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11 Introduction
Conventional rent-seeking frameworks allow analysis of many political and economic in-
teractions where agents expend e⁄ort to win a prize which produces private bene￿ts, such
as litigation, political campaigns, sport events, R&D patents, con￿ icts and natural re-
source rights allocation (Congleton et al. 2008b; Konrad, 2009). However, in many cases,
the consumption or utilisation of the rent plays a fundamental role in determining agents￿
utilities and incentives to invest in e⁄ort. In particular, consumption of the rent often
produces externalities.
It has long been known how to deal with externalities, namely the implementation of
Pigouvian taxation or Coasean bargaining, yet it is currently unclear how these mecha-
nisms perform in rent seeking contests under the presence of externalities. For example,
would producers lobby more to obtain a share of carbon dioxide emission rights than
to obtain a share of radioactive waste rights? Do pollution taxes or tradable pollution
permit markets perform better in controlling rent dissipation? It turns out, the extent of
rent seeking depends on whether consumption produces positive or negative externalities
and the extent of the ￿ globalness￿ . Pigouvian taxation and Coasean bargaining produce
very di⁄erent e⁄ects on rent seeking strategies and payo⁄s which depend, in part, on the
level of marginal externalities. A potentially successful solution is to establish Pigouvian
taxation coupled with some element of lump-sum transfer which may reduce costly rent
seeking e⁄ort and improve the welfare of some agents compared to other approaches.
In conventional contests, negative externalities exist as an agent￿ s probability of ob-
taining a prize declines with an increase in rivals￿e⁄ort (see, for example, Hillman and
Riley, (1989), Nitzan (1994), Congleton et al. (2008a) and Konrad (2009)). Yet, other
externalities exist in contests, such as spillovers from patent races, damage to infrastruc-
ture due to military con￿ icts and so on (Congleton, 1989; Chung, 1996; Lee and Kang,
1998; Sha⁄er, 2006). In order to analyse externalities in contests, it has generally been
assumed that the level of aggregate e⁄ort alters the size of the contestable rent. For ex-
ample, one can consider labour tournaments where the increase in (productive) e⁄ort by
workers results in a larger surplus for all in the organisation. Yet restricting analysis to
2contests that only produce externalities as a result of an endogenously determined rent
(i.e. aggregate e⁄orts in￿ uencing the rent) may not help to explain all types of exter-
nalities present in contests. Importantly, it is possible that while a contest prize remains
￿xed, agents￿consumption of the prize produces additional bene￿ts (costs)￿ consumption
externalities. For example, the capturing of natural resource rights (such as coal, gas, oil,
￿sheries and forestry), may all produce externalities independent of aggregate e⁄ort. Our
prize is a private, excludable and rivalrous rent where the consumption of the prize pro-
duces e⁄ects in the form of both private bene￿ts (damages) and ￿ global￿externalities (for
rivals).1 An important distinction in our model is that the act of consumption produces
transferable externalities (Bird, 1987).2 This means that an agent can transfer (a portion
of) externalities to rival agents in the contest by consuming more of the rent.
The work most relevant to our paper is by Shogren and Crocker (1991), who consider
a contest with transferable externalities among agents.3 They show when agents have
the ability to invest in protection against environmental externalities that over-protection
may occur when externalities are transferable among agents. It is possible that the notion
of transferability externalities can be discussed in a much broader context. In our paper,
consumption externalities are similar to transferable externalities in that, a change in the
distribution of consumption will alter the levels of externalities each agent experiences.
Yet there a number of subtle di⁄erences. First, our externalities are consumption-based,
therefore it is as a consequence of consumption that externalities occur and not ad hoc
externalities in which agents have to protect against. This means that the prize in our
contest is a rivalrous and excludable rent. Second, consumption externalities have an
additional e⁄ect based on private consumption. Therefore, an agent that consumes the
1Contests have also been considered where the prize is a public good (Katz et al., 1990; Ursprung,
1990; Baik, 1993; Gradstein, 1993; Linster, 1993; Riaz et al., 1995; Baik, 2008; Epstein and Mealem,
2009). The conventional approach is to allow individuals (within a group) to independently invest in
e⁄ort where the group with the largest aggregate e⁄ort wins the group-speci￿c public good. In general,
it has been found that, within the winning group, individuals with higher valuations invest more e⁄ort
whereas lower valuing individuals tend to free ride.
2Unrelated to the context of consumption externalities, Appelbaum and Katz (1986) were the ￿rst to
formally consider the e⁄ort of agents when the bene￿ts and costs of a rent are transferred among agents.
3The general theme of externalities can also been considered in a number of contexts, such as contest
where agents can be altruists or envious (e.g. Konrad, 2004) and multiple agents where the losers are
not indi⁄erent about who wins the rent (e.g. Linster, 1993).
3rent will produce global externalities but also experience a private consumption e⁄ect. We
provide further insight for the results of Shogren and Crocker (1991) and show this is a
special case of our framework, where over-e⁄ort occurs as a result of relatively large global
externalities compared to the private consumption e⁄ect. We then compare e⁄ort levels
and payo⁄s in the contest in which Pigouvian and Coasean solutions are implemented.
In this paper, we allow agents to invest in e⁄ort to win a share of a rivalrous and exclud-
able resource which is then fully utilised. Firstly, an agent￿ s consumption of the rent may
provide additional private e⁄ects. Second, agents￿consumption of the rent may produce
externalities for rivals. The consumption externalities e⁄ect is in addition to those expe-
rienced in conventional contests. We ￿nd that in the equilibrium of the contest, agents￿
optimal actions decrease in the index of relative globalness, so that an increase in rela-
tive globalness will increase (decrease) actions for negative (positive) externalities. When
the regulator has the ability to introduce Pigouvian taxation or allow ex post Coasean
bargaining, we ￿nd that taxation reduces e⁄ort whereas this does not always happen for
Coasean bargaining. When Coasean bargaining is introduced agents with high values of
the rent always improve their position (as they experience no externalities from rivals)
whereas for lower value agents it is ambiguous and depends on the relative globalness of
the consumption e⁄ect, the bargaining power of the agents and the asymmetry in agents￿
valuation of the rent. We also show that for su¢ ciently large marginal consumption ex-
ternalities, Pigouvian taxation in which tax revenues are transferred to the agent with the
lowest value may be a desirable mechanism due to Pareto improvements. In particular,
e⁄orts are maintained at conventional Pigouvian levels while the payo⁄ for the low value
agent is larger than under Coasean bargaining.
Our work thus contributes to the growing literature on contests by exploring how the
degree of relative ￿ globalness￿of consumption externalities interact with conventional con-
test externalities in a simple framework. This allows us to analyse the incentive to invest
in e⁄ort to obtain resources that produce externalities of varying degrees of ￿ globalness￿ .
Allowing externalities to be created as a result of consumption provides an additional
method to consider contests. This may highlight important issues in rent seeking for
4natural resources, con￿ ict, patent races and so on, where the consumption of the prize
appears to have important implications for agents￿incentives to invest e⁄ort. Further,
important policy implications occur due to the implementation of Pigouvian taxation or
Coasean bargaining prior to the contest. These results can be directly applied to con-
tests over natural resources. Pigouvian taxes (pollution taxes) and Coasean bargaining
(tradable permit markets) are now commonly experienced in environmental regulation
(Freeman and Kolstad, 2007). This paper adds to the literature on the desirability of
Pigouvian taxes or Coasean bargaining for the control of resources by providing evidence
of signi￿cant di⁄erences in incentives under both regulatory mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out the model
when consumption externalities exist. Section 3 introduces Pigouvian taxes and Coasean
bargaining and shows the changes to equilibrium e⁄ort and payo⁄s and Section 4 has
some concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider a set of agents ￿ = f1;2;:::;ng that participate in a complete information
contest by investing in e⁄ort si 8i 2 ￿ in order to win a share of a rent at a sunk linear
cost. The contestable rent A 2 R+ is rivalrous, excludable and common knowledge to all
agents. However, the rent may produce consumption e⁄ects. That is, the consumption of
the rent may produce local private bene￿ts as well as ￿ global￿externalities on rival agents.
To represent agent i￿ s share of the rent, we de￿ne a share function for agent i given










where ￿i = f1;:::;i ￿ 1;i + 1;:::;ng.
In order to provide insight into the behaviour of agents in the presence of consumption
4For convenience, we discuss a rent that is divisible and is shared among agents. However, our
framework may allow interpretations of both divisible and indivisible prizes when agents are risk neutral.
5externalities, we separate the net bene￿t of obtaining the rent into attainment bene￿ts
and consumption bene￿ts (damages). For the attainment bene￿ts, agent i obtains bene￿ts
from winning the share of the prize which we represent by Li and is determined by (1). The
attainment bene￿t is determined solely by agent i￿ s share of the rent and is independent
of the consumption of the rent. This bene￿t is the value placed on an agent￿ s successful
attainment (share) of the rent, for example, this could represent the value of a patent in
a R&D contest, the value of natural resources won in a rent seeking game, the value of a
wage in a job promotion contest, and so on.
Additional bene￿ts (or costs) may occur due to the consumption of the rent. Firstly,
agent i￿ s utilisation of the rent may produce "global" externalities that a⁄ect rivals. For
example, this could include the consumption of resource rights (i.e. pollution damage)
or the utilisation of patents which produce positive externalities in terms of technological
spillovers. We denote global externalities (borne by agent i) as ￿L￿i where L￿i is the
share of the prize obtained by rivals and ￿ > 0 is a parameter signalling the extent of
consumption externalities, that is, the extent of ￿ globalness￿of consumption externalities,
where a larger ￿ represents more ￿ global￿externalities (in the absolute sense). Second,
when agent i consumes a portion of the rent, it may experience alterations to its own
private bene￿t Li. For example, for negative externalities, one can consider the reduction
in its own bene￿t due to the pollution created. Throughout the paper, we refer to these
e⁄ects as private consumption bene￿ts and denote this by ￿Li where Li is the share
won by agent i in the contest and ￿ > 0 is a parameter denoting the extent of private
consumption bene￿ts. This e⁄ect is rivalrous and excludable with the capturing of the
rent. Throughout we assume full utilisation of the rent by agents.5 Therefore, agent i￿ s
aggregate in￿ uence from rent utilisation is given by the summation of global externalities
and private consumption bene￿ts a⁄ected by consumption given by:
Ei = ! [￿Li + ￿L￿i] (2)
5Introducing a second stage where the agent has the option to only utilise a proportion of the rent that
is won ￿i 2 [0;1], so that local consumption externalities of the equilibrium rent are given by ￿i!vL￿
i will
result in corner solutions for costless consumption. In particular, for negative (positive) local externalities
the agent decides to consume none (all) of the rent.
6where ! indicates whether externalities are positive (! > 0) or negative (! < 0).
2.1 Equilibrium strategy
To demonstrate how contests with consumption externalities di⁄er from conventional
contests, one can compare equilibrium rent seeking e⁄orts. To do this, let us denote
a benchmark model where no consumption externalities exist (Ei = 0) and denote the
benchmark rent seeking e⁄ort by sB
i . The following proposition provides a comparison
of symmetric equilibrium e⁄ort s￿
i = s￿
￿i = s￿ from a contest with externalities and the
benchmark model.
Proposition 1 If ! [￿ ￿ ￿] ? 0 then s￿ ? sB
Proof. See Appendix A.
To the extent that e⁄ort is larger than the benchmark depends on whether consump-
tion externalities are either positive (! > 0) or negative (! < 0) and the relative marginal
globalness of this e⁄ect, that is, the absolute di⁄erence in ￿ ￿ ￿.
Consider positive consumption externalities ! > 0, where global externalities may be
formed due to rivals￿consumption of the rent (￿) and private consumption bene￿ts are also
realized (￿). If ￿ > ￿ then the marginal bene￿t from private consumption bene￿ts is larger
than the marginal bene￿t from global positive externalities. Therefore, an incentive exists
for agent i to increase e⁄ort. It follows that even in the presence of positive consumption
externalities, e⁄ort will be larger than the benchmark model. However, when ￿ < ￿ the
marginal bene￿ts from local consumption externalities are smaller than those from global
externalities. Here we observe the incentive to free ride, as the bene￿ts due to rivals￿
consumption produce larger bene￿ts to agent i than her own bene￿ts from the private
consumption bene￿ts.
Similar logic applies to negative consumption externalities ! < 0, in that if ￿ < ￿,
rivals￿ marginal (negative) consumption externalities are relatively large compared to
the marginal damages from the private consumption bene￿ts experienced by agent i￿ s
consumption, hence, agent i decides to increase e⁄ort in order to reduce the relative
7increase in negative externalities produced by rivals (Shogren and Crocker, 1991). Finally
when ￿ > ￿, the marginal damage from private consumption bene￿ts is larger than the
marginal damage from the global negative externalities so agent i chooses to reduce rent
seeking.
In the existing literature, Shogren and Crocker (1991) are able to show that over-
e⁄ort occurs for negative transferable externalities (and a decrease in e⁄ort caused by
￿lterable externalities). Here, Proposition 1 provides deeper insight for the results of
Shogren and Crocker (1991) in that we ￿nd relative global negative externalities tend to
produce over e⁄ort in contests. Yet we ￿nd additional cases where private consumption
bene￿ts can alter these results. Proposition 1 shows that it is the relative size of local
bene￿ts (costs) and global externalities (and not simply the existence of externalities) that
determines whether an agent over (or under) invests in e⁄ort. This is important when we
begin to consider the utilisation of resources. For example, the consumption of natural
resources has the potential to produce both private consumption damages and global
negative externalities and therefore it depends on the relative size of these externalities
as to whether agents will over- (under-) invest in e⁄ort.6
It is clear from Proposition 1 that even in the presence of private consumption ben-
e￿ts (damages) and global externalities, e⁄ort may not di⁄er from the benchmark level
(however the payo⁄s will be di⁄erent). When ￿ = ￿, the marginal private bene￿ts (costs)
are equal to the marginal gain (cost) from the global positive (negative) externalities. For
example, this may be applicable to contests over carbon dioxide rights. Carbon dioxide is
6An equivalent analysis can also consider group contests. Additional consumption external-
ities arise from the consumption of the remaining members in group i. This we denote as
Li!￿
h





A. where a 2 [0;1] is an exogenous parameter which describes the char-
acteristics of the sharing rule within group i (Nitzan, 1991) and ￿ is a parameter denoting the level of
intra-group externalities. When a = 0, the share to each agent is based on agent k￿ s e⁄ort relative to all
other group i members sik
Si . When a = 1, the prize won by group i is shared equally among all members.
We ￿nd that for v = 0 that @S
@￿ ? 0 if and only if a 7 1=n . When a ! 1 (and hence a > 1=n) the
sharing rule tends in favour of equal distribution which is independent of agents￿e⁄ort. Therefore, given
an increase in fellow group members￿consumption externalities, an incentive exists to reduce e⁄ort in
order to reduce the exposure of externalities by reducing the share of the group￿ s winning share. This is a
perverse incentive in that the agent, in order to reduce exposure from fellow group members￿externalities,
would rather lower their team share of the prize in the group contest. This is a direct consequence of not
being able to transfer externalities by investing in e⁄ort (and hence consumption) as a ! 1. When e⁄ort
(and hence consumption) can transfer externalities, that is, when a ! 0 (a < 1=n), then an increase in
group members￿consumption externalities results in an incentive to increase e⁄ort in order to not only
crowd out rivals, but also to crowd out fellow group members from consuming the prize.
8a ￿ pure￿transboundary pollutant where the (marginal) damages caused by the utilisation
of the rights are independent of the geographical area in which they are produced (￿ = ￿).
Therefore, this contest may produce e⁄ort levels similar to a contest with no consumption
externalities. In these cases, both e⁄ects types perfectly counterbalance each other.
Like many rents, the e⁄ects of consumption may persist throughout time. It is easy
to illustrate the augmented e⁄ect of persistent externalities.7 To represent this, we allow
consumption externalities to persist throughout (in￿nite) time and ￿ decay￿at a rate ￿ in
each year (from the initial consumption) with a discount factor ￿ = 1
1+r; where r > 0
is the discount rate. Therefore, present value consumption externalities are given by:
1
1￿￿￿! [￿ ￿ ￿]. When ￿ = 0 consumption externalities are simply the value in the present
period whereas when ￿ = 1 we have inde￿nite consumption externalities (which is dis-
counted throughout time). The varying levels of persistence can be seen by focusing on
resource rights where the levels of decay can vary dramatically from a few weeks (such as
methane emissions) to hundreds of years (such as radioactive material).
An increase in persistence will increase the distortion in equilibrium rent seeking e⁄ort.
If ! [￿ ￿ ￿] > 0 then @s￿
@￿ > 0 whereas if ! [￿ ￿ ￿] < 0 then @s￿
@￿ < 0. When marginal
consumption externalities are positive and the e⁄ect is relatively ￿ local￿ then agent i
will increase rent seeking e⁄ort. Therefore, as persistence increases, this augments the
marginal bene￿t to agent i so that rent seeking e⁄ort is increased.
2.2 Asymmetric valuations
For tractability, let us assume a contest consists of two participating agents k = L;H
which have asymmetric values of the rent. In particular, agents L and H have values
of the rent AL and AH respectively, where, without loss of generality, we assume that
AL < AH so that agent H has a larger valuation of the rent than agent L.
We focus, for the rest of the paper, on negative consumption externalities and nor-
7Here we assume that consumption of the prize is a ￿ one-o⁄￿event and in future periods only decaying
consumption externalities are experienced. Therefore the strategic decisions are static. It is also possible
to introduce a dynamic game in that we have repeated consumption with a stock of externalities being
in￿ uenced by the historical levels of externalities and current period consumption. For dynamic and
repeated contests see Cairns (1989), Leininger and Yang (1994), Wirl (1994) and Sha⁄er and Shogren
(2008)
9malise the size of externalities to ! = ￿1 and the private consumption bene￿t (damage)
so that v = 0. It is also possible to consider positive consumption externalities of varying
degrees. Each agent experiences a level of negative externalities equal to the consumption














AH ￿ sH (4)
From (3) and (4), each agent obtains the rent equal to their investment in e⁄ort relative
to total e⁄ort with the addition of negative externalities from rivals￿consumptions.
Di⁄erentiating (3) and (4) with respect to sL and sH respectively and solving for





k = (1 + ￿)
￿
(1 + ￿)
2Ak for k = L;H (5)
where ￿ ￿
AL











for k = L;H (6)
From (5), equilibrium e⁄ort is distorted up due to negative externalities whilst payo⁄s
are distorted downwards compared to the case without consumption externalities. As
shown in Proposition 1, as marginal negative externalities increase, equilibrium e⁄ort
also increases, to crowd out the rivals and reduce negative consumption externalities.
Note that (5) and (6) can be rewritten so that ^ AL = (1+￿)AL and similarly for agent
H. It follows that for valuations
￿
^ AL; ^ AH
￿
the analysis has similarities to conventional











8The second order conditions are satis￿ed at the optimal values of rent-seeking.
10We now show how agents￿rent seeking e⁄orts and payo⁄s change given alternative regu-
latory mechanisms to control externalities.
3 Equilibrium e⁄ort and payo⁄s under the establish-
ment of Pigouvian taxation and Coasean bargain-
ing
3.1 The regulator￿ s optimal choice of price or quantities
As before, let us assume that in the regulator￿ s economy there are two agents with asym-
metric valuations which obtain bene￿t from obtaining a share of the aggregate regulator￿ s
prize which produces consumption externalities. To control for externalities, the regu-
lator has the ability to establish Pigouvian and Coasean mechanisms. In our context,
externalities are transferable in that an agent￿ s consumption can transfer externalities to
the rival. As Baumol and Oates (1988) and Bird (1987) explain, to reach an e¢ cient out-
come, a unit tax should be set equal to the marginal social damage caused by transferring
externalities to the rival. In this case, the Pigouvian tax is levied at ￿￿ = ￿. Further,
allowing the prize to be ex-post allocated reaches an e¢ cient outcome. The agent with
the highest willingness to pay (to possibly avoid exposure from externalities) can purchase
the prize and compensate the rival in the form of price per unit. Similar to the Pigou-
vian tax, the amount of ex post reallocated rent allowed for an e¢ cient outcome is equal












L. As it is well known how Pigouvian
taxation and Coasean bargaining are optimally chosen in a regulatory system (See, for
example, Bamoul and Oates, 1988), we instead focus on the consequence for equilibrium
rent seeking and payo⁄s given these mechanisms are chosen optimally by the regulator.
In particular, it is clear that, given complete certainty in the bene￿ts and costs of the
production of externalities, the use of price (Pigouvian taxes) and quantity (Coasean bar-
gaining) mechanisms should yield the same result (Weitzman, 1974). In our context, this
means from the viewpoint of expected costs, allowing a rent to be ex post reallocated
11will result in the same outcome as if a tax per unit of externality is levied. However, an
open question arises with respect to whether Pigouvian taxes or Coasean bargaining is
the preferred regulatory mechanism when the resources are allocated through a contest.
In particular, how do Pigouvian taxation and Coasean ex post reallocation responses to
consumption externalities di⁄er in their in￿ uence on socially wasteful rent seeking e⁄ort
and agents￿payo⁄s?
3.2 Pigouvian taxation
The ￿rst approach to controlling externalities is the introduction of a tax based on con-
sumption and hence the transfer of externalities. In this context, an agent that wins a
share of the rent must also pay the unit tax applicable to the damage caused by their
consumption externalities.9 For the tax rate ￿￿ based on the level of consumption exter-
























AH ￿ sH (9)
which is solved for (sP
L;sP
H).
From (8), agent L ￿ s tax burden is equal to the amount of externalities produced by
its consumption
￿￿sL
sL+sHAL and similarly for agent H. As the marginal rate of externalities
are assumed to be identical for both agents (the marginal increase in agents￿share of the
rent is equal to ￿), one simply needs to levy a common tax rate ￿￿
L = ￿￿ = ￿￿
H.10
9Here, the tax is based on the share of the rent consumed by each player. Other possible taxes exist
which may include taxation of realised pro￿ts or rent-seeking expenditures (Glazer and Konrad, 1999;
Katz and Rosenberg, 2000; Epstein and Nitzan, 2002).
10It is also possible to have asymmetric tax rates based on the heterogeneous distribution of the
externality. For example, this occurs in many pollution problems that have non-uniform transboundary
spillover rates, such as the case for SO2 emissions in the United States (Ellerman et al., 2000).
123.3 Coasean bargaining
An alternative solution is to allow the rent to be reallocated among the agents ex post.11
The clearest example of such a process is the recent introduction of tradable pollution
permit markets where ￿rms through the (partial) process of rent seeking obtain an initial
allocation of permits and are allowed to ex post trade (Hanley and MacKenzie, 2009).
We follow a framework similar to Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2009) but allow the market
price of the rent to be determined by the bargaining power of both agents and independent
of shares won in the contest. Formally, the price is determined by
￿ = ￿AL + (1 ￿ ￿)AH (10)
where ￿ is the bargaining power of agent H and AL < ￿ < AH.12 From (10), an increase
in the bargaining power of the high valuing agent (agent H) results in the market price
of the rent decreasing. This determines a common value of the rent, which as we will see
below, has important implications for e⁄ort strategies.
Given an ex post reallocation of the rent is possible, it is e¢ cient to allow low value
agents to sell their share of the rent to high value agents. As agent L is the lowest value
agent, any share of the rent won on the contest is sold to agent H at the price determined
in (10). This price is at least as big as agent L￿ s valuation of the rent. Therefore, agent L
sells all rent won in the contest to agent H and obtains the revenue
sL
sL+sH￿ but experiences






￿ ￿ ￿AL ￿ sL (11)
which is optimally solved for sC
L.
For agent H, additional to the share of rent won in the contest
sH
sL+sHAH, it has
the opportunity to purchase the remaining rent at a price that is lower that its own
11Ex post reallocation (resale) has been extensively discussed by Gupta and Lebrun (1999), Zheng
(2002), Haile (2003), Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2009), Garratt and Tr￿ger (2006), Hafalir and Krishna (2008)
and Sui (2009).
12In order for tractability, we assume exogenous bargaining however there are other possibilities. Most
bargain problems proceed with exogenous bargaining power, such as the Nash bargaining program.
13valuation. Therefore the additional bene￿t obtained due to Coasean bargaining is given
as
sL
sL+sH(AH ￿ ￿). As agent H now consumes the entire rent after ex post reallocation,
it no longer experiences any negative externalities from the rival. Formally, agent H ￿ s









(AH ￿ ￿) ￿ sH (12)
which is optimally solved for sC
H.
3.4 Comparison of Pigouvian and Coasean solutions
3.4.1 Equilibrium strategies
As shown in Appendix B, the equilibrium e⁄ort levels for both policy mechanisms are now






4 for k = L;H.
By comparing the equilibrium solutions obtained from (5)-(12), we can directly compare
the e⁄ects of Pigouvian and Coasean solutions compared to both the benchmark model
and the model where consumption externalities exist. The next proposition solves the
equilibrium e⁄ort solutions and provides a ranking.































Proof. See Appendix B.
14Proposition 2 shows that introducing Pigouvian taxation reduces e⁄ort in the contest
compared to a contest with uncontrolled consumption externalities and the e⁄ort chosen
is identical to a contest with no consumption externalities sB
k = sP
k .13 This is easily under-
stood as the Pigouvian tax directly targets agents￿external costs of their externalities. In
terms of comparing Pigouvian and Coasean solutions, the intuition is as follows. Coasean
bargaining allows agent H to obtain the rent by trading which softens her incentive to
supply e⁄ort. We can see this further by analysing ￿￿(H), the bargaining power of agent
H that equates e⁄ort from Pigouvian and Coasean policies. For ￿0 > ￿￿(H) a su¢ ciently
high bargaining power of agent H will result in an e⁄ort level lower than that in the
Pigouvian case, as the rent can be purchased at a lower price on the ex post market. If
agent H reduces e⁄ort in the contest, this increases competition in the contest and this
coupled with the fact that agent L can sell the rent on the market (for a higher value)
results in agent L having larger rent seeking under Coasean bargaining.
Interesting results occur when one considers e⁄ort of Coasean bargaining compared
to a contest with uncontrolled externalities (s￿
k). Allowing for an additional regulatory
mechanism to control for externalities may, in some cases, actually increase the equilibrium
level of socially unproductive e⁄ort. The following corollary provides a comparison of the
e⁄ort of agents.
Corollary 1 For rents that produce consumption externalities, allowing Coasean bargain-
ing may either increase or decrease rent seeking for both agents relative to the case with
uncontrolled externalities ( sC
k ? s￿
k for k = L;H).
Proof. See Appendix B.
A counter-intuitive result from Corollary 1 shows that allowing Coasean bargaining
may actually increase the total socially unproductive e⁄ort. In the existing literature,
Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2009) ￿nd a similar result without the inclusion of consumption ex-
ternalities. To see the intuition of our result, let us directly compare the equilibrium e⁄orts
13One can also extend this to an incomplete information setting (Malueg and Yates, 2004; Fey, 2008).
Allowing types Ai 2 fAL;AHg, each agent has a probability of drawing AL with 1/2 and AH with
1/2. Given agents￿own types are private information and their rival￿ s type is drawn from the probability
distribution, we ￿nd qualitatively similar results in that sB
k = sP
k < s￿
k for k = L;H. Therefore, Pigouvian
taxation in the incomplete information setting continues to reduce e⁄orts.







for k = L;H. There are two important di⁄erences. Firstly, introducing Coasean bargain-
ing eliminates the dependence on consumption externalities ￿. This occurs as Coasean
bargaining allows the lowest value agent to su⁄er all externalities due to selling all rents
to the high value agent. E⁄ort is now independent of the relative globalness of negative
externalities. It follows then that sC
k > s￿
k when the relative globalness is low. This is
in line with Proposition 1 as the lower relative globalness of externalities results in lower
equilibrium e⁄ort (s￿
k). Second, notice that in Coasean bargaining each agent selects e⁄ort
based on the market value of the rent instead of simply their own valuation. Therefore,
it is possible to have sC
k > s￿
k when the market value of the rent is relatively high. This
can occur for two main reasons. From (10), the market value of the rent is determined
by both the bargaining power of agents (￿) and their valuations. Therefore, both agents
increase e⁄ort when either ￿ is low (the low value agent has improved bargaining power)
or when agent H￿ s valuation increases (i.e. a low ￿). Given a reduction in the level of ￿,
agent H now has to pay relatively more for agent L￿ s share of the rent, hence there is an
incentive for agent H to increase e⁄ort to avoid paying the additional price. Similarly, as
agent L has a better bargaining position it has an incentive to increase e⁄ort to obtain
a larger share of the rent to sell to agent H. Similar logic applies for an increase in the
value agent H places on the prize.
From Proposition 2, it is unclear in terms of aggregate e⁄orts, which policies produce
the highest and lowest aggregate e⁄orts as agent L invests more e⁄ort under Coasean
bargaining whereas agent H may invest more under Pigouvian taxation. Denoting aggre-
gate e⁄orts by F, direct comparison of aggregate e⁄orts show that F P = F B < F ￿. As
expected, the Pigouvian and benchmark e⁄orts are identical and lower e⁄ort compared
to a contest that does not control externalities. However, the ranking when one considers
Coasean bargaining is ambiguous. For F C ? F P then






16and similarly for F C ? F ￿ then
￿(￿ ￿ 1) + 1
2




From (13), it can be seen that aggregate rent seeking e⁄ort from Pigouvian and
Coasean solutions are equal F C = F P when the su¢ cient condition is met: ￿￿F ￿ 1
1+￿.
This shows that the value of bargaining power where F C = F P is given by the range
[1
2;1]. As shown above, we can observe that Pigouvian taxation produces the lowest ag-
gregate rent seeking when ￿0 < ￿￿F, that is, when agent H has low bargaining power.
Indeed, Pigouvian taxation always results in lower aggregate e⁄ort when agent L has the
majority of the bargaining power, that is, ￿0 < 1
2. However, when we compare aggregate
e⁄orts under Coasean bargaining to aggregate e⁄orts in the contest with uncontrolled
externalities, we see that the degree of globalness does have a role to play. From (14),
an increase in the degree of globalness places downward pressure on the aggregate e⁄orts
of Coasean policies, thus making it more likely to be smaller than aggregate e⁄orts from
a contest with uncontrolled externalities. It is clear that, given F C < F P, we must also
have F C < F ￿. However, when F C > F P, the degree of globalness will determine whether
F C > F ￿ or F C < F ￿.
3.4.2 Equilibrium payo⁄s
Let us now turn to the comparison of equilibrium payo⁄s for both agents. The next
corollary provides a comparison of payo⁄s.































17Proof. See Appendix C.
Corollary 2 shows that for both agents, the introduction of a Pigouvian tax produces
the lowest possible payo⁄ from the contest. In particular, it can be seen that Coasean
bargaining tends to produce larger payo⁄s for both agents than Pigouvian taxation. Our
results show that the ranking for agent H is clear: Coasean bargaining produces the
largest payo⁄s. Agent H has the ability to purchase additional shares of the rent on the
market at a price lower than agent H￿ s value. As a consequence, agent H consumes the
entire rent and experiences no negative externalities (which is borne solely by agent L).
Indeed, this is the reason why Coasean bargaining for agent L may produce an ambiguous
payo⁄ ranking compared to the benchmark and uncontrolled externalities models. The
payo⁄ ranking for agent L crucially depends on the relative globalness of externalities
￿. We ￿nd for a large ￿, agent L will obtain a lower payo⁄ compared to the benchmark
model and when externalities are uncontrolled.
3.5 Pigouvian taxation with lump-sum transfers
Up to this point, we have not discussed what happens to the Pigouvian tax revenue. In
this setting, it is possible for the regulator to redistribute tax revenues to the participating






Using this tax revenue, It is possible to show that Pareto improvements do exist,
compared to conventional Pigouvian taxation. In particular,
Proposition 3 A Pareto improvement occurs in a Pigouvian taxation system when tax















Proof. See Appendix D.
18Proposition 3 shows that transferring all tax revenue to the agent with the lowest value
produces a Pareto improvement. As the revenue is distributed lump-sum, rent seeking
e⁄orts are still maintained at their conventional Pigouvian levels. Further, the payo⁄ for
agent L is at least as large as the payo⁄ obtained from the benchmark model (with no
consumption externalities). Notice that this occurs with the lowest amount of tax revenue
distributed to agent L (￿AL).14 Importantly, transferring the tax revenue to agent H,
even the largest possible amount ￿AH, cannot increase payo⁄s above the benchmark or
Coasean solutions. One issue with Coasean bargaining is that agent L will experience
all consumption externalities and as a consequence, their payo⁄ is low. However, given
Pigouvian taxation with revenue recycling and where consumptions externalities are suf-
￿ciently large (￿ ￿ ￿
T), it follows that agent L￿ s payo⁄ is larger than under Coasean
bargaining.
4 Conclusions
Many situations that involve expending e⁄ort for common contestable rents are a⁄ected
by the consumption of the rent. Given this, it is important to understand how equilib-
rium e⁄ort changes when consumption externalities exists and how alternative policies
to control externalities a⁄ect e⁄ort levels and payo⁄s. Unlike standard contest problems,
the utilisation of the rent can produce local bene￿ts (costs) as well as both positive and
negative global externalities from rivals￿consumption. Therefore, the purpose of this pa-
per is to investigate incentives behind e⁄ort when the consumption of an excludable and
rivalrous rent produces a consumption e⁄ect and compare the e⁄ects of Pigouvian and
Coasean regulatory mechanisms.
Our simple model allows agents to rent seek over a common contestable rent which has
the potential to produce consumption externalities. These consumption externalities are
14Improvements in agents￿payo⁄s can be seen more clearly when we assume symmetric agents. In such
a cases, the revenue transfer is ￿A. It is easy to show that a Pareto improvement exists between the
contest with consumption externalities and a contest with revenue neutral Pigouvian taxation for any tax
revenue transfer. Further, aggregate payo⁄s also increase with respect to the benchmark contest without
consumption externalities given the transfer belongs to the set where for transfers Ri >
￿A
4 ;Ri+R￿i ￿ ￿A
for transfers Ri, R￿i.
19in addition to those experienced in conventional contests. We ￿nd that in the equilibrium
of the contest, agents￿optimal actions decrease in the index of relative globalness. The
intuition for this result is as follows. For positive consumption externalities, agents have
an incentive to decrease e⁄ort when relative globalness increases as the agent can free
ride. Considering negative consumption externalities, an increase in globalness results in
an incentive to increase e⁄ort in order to crowd out rivals￿allocation of the rent, reduce
rivals￿share of consumption and hence negative externalities that they produce. Allow-
ing additional polices to control externalities, namely Pigouvian taxation and Coasean
bargaining, alters the amount invested in e⁄ort. In particular, Pigouvian taxation tend
to lower the amount of resources used where this may not always happen under Coasean
bargaining.
Considering the ￿ndings in this paper, it is important for governments and policy-
makers to understand when, and to what extent, e⁄ort plays an important role in deter-
mining the composition of the contestable rent. To this end, regulators need to carefully
consider the size of the rent and the characteristics of consumption externalities before
initiating regulation. In particular, for many policy considerations, Pigouvian taxation
coupled with some element of lump-sum transfer may reduce costly rent seeking e⁄ort
and improve the welfare of some agents compared to other approaches. Future work may
focus on intertemporal aspects of consumption externalities where the utilisation of the
prize and the subsequent exposure to externalities may happen in multiple time peri-
ods and where externalities persist throughout time. Further studies may focus on the
informational settings within this model and introduce asymmetric information among
agents.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Ayre Hillman, Tatiana Kornienko, Jason Shogren and
participants at EPCS 2009 for useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer
applies.
20References
Appelbaum, E., Katz, E., 1986. Transfer seeking and avoidance: on the full social costs
of rent seeking. Public Choice, 48, 175-181.
Baik, K. H., 1993. E⁄ort levels in contests: The public-good prize case. Economics Letters,
41, 363-367.
Baik. K. H., 2008. Contests with group-speci￿c public-good prizes. Social Choice and
Welfare, 30, 101-117.
Baumol, W.J., Oates, W.E., 1988. The Theory of environmental Policy., Second ed. Cam-
bridge University Press, New York.
Bird, P. J. W. N., 1987. The transferability and depletability of externalities. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 14, 54-57.
Cairns, R. D., 1989. The dynamics of rent seeking. Journal of Public Economics, 39,
315-334.
Chung T-Y., 1996. rent seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate e⁄orts.
Public Choice, 87, 55-66.
Congleton, R. D., 1989. E¢ cient status seeking: externalities and the evolution of status
games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 11, 175-190.
Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L., Konrad, K. A. (Eds.) 2008a. 40 years of research on
rent seeking 1: theory of rent seeking. Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag.
Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L., Konrad, K. A. (Eds.) 2008b. 40 years of research on
rent seeking 2: Applications: rent seeking in practice. Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag.
Dari-Mattiacci, G., Opstal, S., Parisi, F., 2009. Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase.
Public choice, 139, 171-196.
21Ellerman, A. D., Joskow, P. L., Schmalensee, R, Montero, J-P., Bailey, E. M. 2000.
Markets for clear air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program. Centre for Energy and Environmental
Policy Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge University Press.
Epstein G. S., Mealem, Y., 2009. Group speci￿c public goods, orchestration of interest
groups with free riding. Public Choice, forthcoming.
Epstein G. S. Nitzan, S., 2002. Asymmetry and corrective public policy in contests. Public
Choice, 113, 231-240.
Fey, M., 2008. rent seeking contests with incomplete information. Public Choice, 135,
225-236.
Freeman, J., Kolstad, C., (Eds.) 2007. Moving to Markets: lessons from Twenty Years of
Experience. Oxford University Press, New York.
Garratt, R., Tr￿ger, T., 2006. Speculation in standard auctions with resale. Econometrica,
74, 753-769.
Glazer, A., Konrad, K. A., 1999. Taxation of rent seeking activities. Journal of Public
Economics, 72, 61-72.
Gradstein, M., 1993. Rent seeking and the provision of public goods. The Economic
Journal, 103, 1236-1243.
Gupta, M., Lebrun, B., 1999. First price auctions with resale. Economics Letters, 64,
181-185.
Hafalir, I., Krishna, V., 2008. Asymmetric auctions with resale. American Economic Re-
view, 98, 87-112.
Haile, P.A., 2003. Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities. Journal of
Economic Theory, 108, 72-110
Hanley, N., MacKenzie, I. A., 2009. The e⁄ects of rent seeking over tradable pollution
permits. University of Stirling, working paper, 2009-12.
22Hillman, A., Riley, J.G., 1989. Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and
Politics 1, 17-39.
Katz, E., Rosenberg, J., 2000. Some implication of corporate taxation for rent seeking
activity. Public Choice, 102, 151-164.
Katz, E., Nitzan, S., Rosenberg, J., 1990. rent seeking for pure public goods. Public
Choice, 65, 49-60.
Konrad, K. A., 2004. Altruism and envy in contests: An evolutionarily stable symbiosis.
Social Choice and Welfare, 22, 479-490.
Konrad, K. A., 2009. Strategy and Dynamics in Contests. Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford.
Lee, S., Kang, J., 1998. Collective contests with externalities. European Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 14, 727-738.
Leininger, W., Yang, C-L., 1994. Dynamic rent seeking games. Games and Economic
Behavior, 7, 406-427.
Linster, B. G., 1993. A generalized model of rent seeking behavior. Public Choice, 77,
421-435.
Malueg, D. A., Yates, A. J. 2004. Rent seeking with private values. Public Choice, 119,
161-178.
Nti, K. O., 1999. rent seeking with asymmetric valuations. Public Choice, 98, 415-430.
Nitzan, S., 1991. Collective rent dissipation. The Economic Journal, 101, 1522-1534.
Nitzan, S., 1994. Modelling rent seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy,
10 41-60.
Riaz, K., Shogren, J. F., Johnson, S.R., 1995. A general model of rent seeking for public
goods. Public Choice, 82, 243-259.
23Sha⁄er, S., 2006. War, labor tournaments and contest payo⁄s. Economics Letters, 92,
250-255.
Sha⁄er, S., Shogren, J. F., 2008. In￿nitely repeated contests: how strategic interaction
a⁄ects the e¢ ciency of governance. Regulation and Governance, 2, 234-252.
Shogren, J. F., Crocker, T. D. 1991. Cooperative and noncooperative protection against
transferable and ￿lterable externalities. Environmental and Resource Economics, 1, 195-
214.
Sui, Y., 2009. rent seeking contests with private values and resale. Public Choice, 138,
409-422.
Tullock, G., 1980. E¢ cient Rent Seeking. In: Buchanan, J. M., Tolison, R. D. and Tullock,
G. (Eds.), Towards a theory of the rent seeking society, Texas A&M University Press.
Ursprung, H.W., 1990. Public goods, rent dissipation and candidate competition. Eco-
nomics and Politics, 2, 115-132.
Weitzman, M., 1974. Prices vs. quantities. Review of Economic Studies, 41, 477-491.
Wirl, F., 1994. The dynamics of lobbying- a di⁄erential game. Public Choice, 80, 307-323.
Zheng, C. Z., 2002. Optimal auction with resale. Econometrica, 70, 2197-2224.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. The objective function for agent i with consumption externalities is given by:
max
si
￿i = Li + Ei ￿ si for all i 2 ￿
substituting in (1) and solving, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is given by:
s
￿ = ! [v ￿ ￿]
(n ￿ 1)
n2 A





comparison of the two rent seeking strategies yields the result.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. We start by solving the Pigouvian tax and Coasean bargaining payo⁄ functions.










































where ￿ = (1￿￿￿ +￿). The optimal Pigouvian tax holds when ￿￿ = ￿ which reduces the









AH 2 (0;1) and k = L;H.
Let us now consider e⁄ort in the presence of Coasean bargaining. Di⁄erentiating (11)
25and (12) with respect to sL and sH respectively, yields
sH
(sL + sH)2￿ ￿ 1
sL
(sL + sH)2AH ￿
sL
(sL + sH)2(AH ￿ ￿) ￿ 1
equating to zero and rearranging gives:
sH
(sL + sH)2￿ ￿ 1 = 0
sL
(sL + sH)2￿ ￿ 1 = 0
solving this we obtain the equilibrium e⁄ort strategies of agents L and H with the potential









Let us start with the case for agent L. Given the equilibrium of e⁄ort for agent L in





L. Next for sP
L < sC
















￿(￿ ￿ 1) + 1
4
< 0
which always holds for ￿ > 0. For completeness we also can show sP
L < s￿
L where using












which holds as 1 < (1 + ￿).
26Let us turn to agent H. For sB
H = sP























1 < (1 + ￿)
which holds given ￿, ￿ > 0. The case of sP
H and sC




￿(￿ ￿ 1) + 1
4
has ambiguous sign. Setting to zero and rearranging for ￿ yields ￿￿(H) ￿
1￿￿
(1+￿)2 where
￿￿(H) occurs when sP
H = sC
H. Therefore, for ￿0 ? ￿￿(H) then sC
H 7 sP
H.
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also with ambiguous sign.
27Appendix C
Proof of Corollary 2:
Proof. Using the equilibrium e⁄ort strategies found in the proof of Proposition 2 and
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Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. To compare ￿PN
L ￿ ￿B












where RL is the lump-sum transfer to agent L. This is reduced to:
￿￿AL + RL ￿ 0
From expression 15 we know that RL ￿ ￿AL. Therefore it holds that ￿￿AL + RL ￿ 0.














and this means that ￿PN
L ￿ ￿C
L when for ￿ > ￿
T where ￿
T is given by:
￿
T =
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